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Enterprise Proof (procurement-friendly index)

This folder is a dry, auditable index of Helix’s trust posture: security posture, threat model, signing/verification model, and what receipts do (and do not) guarantee.

make eval-azimuth-auroc-helix-ontarget
make eval-offtarget-auroc-baseline
make demo-auroc-delta

One-command buyer proof (AUROC delta)

make demo-auroc-delta

What you should verify (no hand-waving):

  • Container digest (record the exact image digest you ran).
  • Evaluation pack id + pack digest:
    • Pack manifest SHA256 (preferred when present), and
    • Labels SHA256 (fallback digest and cross-check).
  • Rerun stability: run the same command twice and confirm the printed Baseline bundle SHA256 and Candidate bundle SHA256 lines match exactly.
  • Cross-machine stability: run on two machines using the same container digest and confirm the same SHA256 lines match exactly.

Details and evidence-bundle contents: enterprise_proof/auroc_delta_demo.md.

Buyer golden path (cut + prime + batch evidence packet)

make buyer-export-evidence

What you should verify:

  • Suite verdict is buyer_suite_ready (cut, prime, and batch legs pass by default).
  • Evidence packet sha256 matches the locked golden catalog for the profile (default: 7e5f826f1c78e1ff40155a5b34bccc82c2c5a855e6c17de7f6096a293de238c1).
  • Export receipt sha256 matches the locked catalog receipt digest (default: ccbcc4349bf5970f38acdab188345da4150495e4e4f92a289012e034436f85f6).
  • helix buyer verify-procurement returns PASS (unified verify-all-profiles + catalog sync).
  • helix verify buyer-evidence-packet … returns no errors.
  • Nested audit packs and batch bundle verify via their manifests.

Full replay from source checkout: make buyer-procurement-replay.

Details: enterprise_proof/buyer_golden_path.md.

Public benchmark replication (Azimuth)

  • Azimuth public evaluation pack (in silico, pack-bound): enterprise_proof/azimuth_public.md
  • Off-target public evaluation pack (in silico, pack-bound): enterprise_proof/offtarget_public.md

Security posture

  • Security policy: policies/security.md
  • Repository security disclosures: ../SECURITY.md
  • Release provenance + SBOMs: policies/release_provenance.md

Threat model

  • Threat model: threat_model.md

Signing + verification model

  • Plugin signing model: policies/plugin_governance.md
  • Validation verdict signing:
    • Algorithm: Ed25519
    • Signed bytes: canonical JSON of the verdict payload with signature=null (whitespace/key-order proof)
    • Verifier enforces the declared canonicalization (helix.canonical_json_bytes.v1)
    • Verifier rejects unknown canonicalization identifiers
  • Verification commands:
    • Single receipt: helix verify verdict path/to/verdict.json --pubkey publisher.pub
    • Bundle receipts: helix verify bundle helix-reference-validation-bundle-<TAG>-linux.tar.gz --json-out verify_bundle.json

Receipts (what they guarantee)

If helix verify bundle … succeeds, then (at minimum):

  • Every verdict.json is signed by the publisher key (or the explicitly pinned --pubkey).
  • Every receipt’s bytes match the release inventory (bundle.index.json SHA-256).
  • Every receipt’s semantics match the release inventory (expectedStatus).

Receipts do not claim biological truth; they prove computational provenance + integrity of the recorded verdicts and their declared expectations.

Deployment acceptance gates (Teams/Enterprise)

For any Teams/Enterprise deployment, treat the published reference validation bundle as a platform contract:

  • Public validation packs must run through the remote lane
  • Receipts/artifacts must land in the artifact store + run registry
  • The deployment is “healthy” only if helix verify bundle … passes against the published reference bundle

Evaluation + operations